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 Introduction
The theme of interconnection between technologies of power and technologies of the self
was a recurring topic of Foucault’s work. Technologies of power are in Foucault’s thought
associated with processes of subjection - the ways in which subject is formed by impera-
tives of various forms of knowledge or by surveillance and training. On the other hand,
technologies of the self are associated with processes of subjectification - the ways in
which individuals relate to themselves in order to shape their selves according to a certain
ethical ideal and a particular guidance for the proper way of living. These two levels are in
Foucault’s later thought seen as always interrelated and technologies of the self are
understood to be associated with certain type of technologies of power (Foucault
2000:225). It is through concept of governmentality that Foucault sought to capture their
interconnection and to reflect on how we are governed within particular rationalities of
government defined broadly as a ‘conduct of conduct’. Lemke argues that the concept of
governmentality is useful, above all, precisely because it helps us to theorise the link
between technologies of power and technologies of the self, or between “the constitution
of the subject and the formation of the state” (Lemke 2001, 2002:50). Similarly, Allen
(2011) argues persuasively that the combination of focus on these two dimensions - how
the self is constituted by power-knowledge relations and the ways in which subject consti-
tutes itself - is the crucial tenet of Foucault’s critical project. 
Foucault (2008) opened the study into the emergence and discursive roots of neo-liberal
governmentality. This project was later developed by many followers (Barry, Osborne, and
Rose 1996; Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2010; Dilts 2011; Gane 2012, 2014; Miller
and Rose 2008; Read 2009; Rose 1999a, 1999b; Springer 2012) into a burgeoning
inquiry that seeks to understand the neoliberal rationalities of government through explo-
ration of what type of subjectivity is both presupposed and simultaneously produced
through the reforms, programs and technologies of neo-liberal government. Neoliberal for-
mula of government is based on the understanding that governments should above all
create an arena in which citizens can freely develop their own strategies of well-being
using their freedom, skills and determination in order to succeed. Government should limit
itself to ensuring such conditions where these efforts can be played out without unneces-
sary constraints and outcome of these individual strategies can be maximised. Simultane-
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of their life strategies (Lesenich 2010). The ideal subject presupposed by this formula of
government takes the form of homo economicus - a rationally calculating entrepreneurial
agent acting out of self-interest, seeking maximisation of its human capital thus maximis-
ing its economic gains. As Foucault puts it, homo economicus is “an entrepreneur, the
entrepreneur of himself” (Foucault 2008:226). 
However revealing this line of inquiry is, this article argues that the unequal attention has
so far been paid to the two levels of investigation into the neo-liberal governmentality.
Many accounts focus on the form the ideal subject of neo-liberalism takes in economic
theories or general plans for government of particular institutional field. Their point of view
is usually that of theoretical school or institution presupposing an ideal subject. As Binkley
puts it, governmentality scholarship suffers from ‘macro-level bias’ (Binkley 2009, 2011).
In other words, its attention often stays with the issue of what ideal subject is presup-
posed by these grand designs and the tools designed to form the subject into particular
shape. What is lost within this perspective are the ways in which individuals are invited to
think about themselves as a certain type of subject and perform a work on their selves in
order to achieve a particular change in their lives. This article’s goal is to contribute to our
understanding of this problematics: discourses and practices offered to subjects to take
up in their pursuits to change themselves and to become individuals of certain kind. It will
inquire into a particular case of guidelines for living that are offered to subjects to help
them in their striving to become successful and satisfied agents within the contemporary
social conditions. In other words, the article will focus on a particular case of a technology
of the self that is supposed to help agents to become successful and fulfilled productive
subjects. 
In what follows I will draw on two lectures concerned with a practice of professional self-
development provided by two “experts of subjectivity” (Rose 1999a:24). Lectures were
given to university students attending a conference concerned with successful career and
professional life. The two lectures will be taken as an illustrative case of technology of the
self, illuminating how individuals are invited to think about themselves and work on them-
selves in a particular manner. I will argue that the version of subjectivity entailed in the two
lectures differs considerably from a pure picture of homo economicus as described in
works concerned with neo-liberal governmentality. I will contend that rather than instruct-
ing the individual to become a pure rationally calculating maximisers of economic gain,
the lectures identify within the subject an ethical substance - the authentic self - that is
seen as an important value in one’s life. In addition, I will argue that rather than portraying
an individual as a self-enclosed unit rejecting any concerns with problems of collective life,
the two lectures take the authentic self as a basis for a larger critique of power arrange-
ments and tie the individual life to a larger vision of a proper society. Finally, using the two
lectures as a backdrop to a discussion of the study of neo-liberal governmentality, I will
argue for more careful and detailed exploration of how individual lives and subjectivities
are incorporated into the schemes of neoliberal governmentality. 
The discussion is divided into four parts. The first section develops a critical reading of
studies of neoliberal governmentality and the position of homo economicus as a supposed
model for technologies of the self used by individuals navigating the waters of neo-liberal
society. The second section uses the empirical material to illustrate how discourse of pro-23
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as a basis for a particular technology of the self grounded in introspection and dialogical
exploration of one’s authentic personality. The third section explores implications this
technology of the self has for thinking about collective social life. It shows how it is tied to
a critique of normalising pressures and disciplinary institutions as well as to a positive
vision of an ideal society. Finally the conclusion (the fourth section) ties empirical material
back to discussion of subjectivity in neo-liberal governmentality. 
Neoliberal governmentality and technologies of the self 
The link between the ways in which human beings are shaped into subjects of certain kind
(technologies of power) and the ways in which human beings themselves work on their
selves in order to became proper subjects according to various ethical doctrines (technol-
ogies of the self) is central to Foucault’s thought about rationalities of government (or gov-
ernmentalities). In parts of his writing, Foucault refers to this link when he says: “This
encounter between the technologies of the domination of others and those of the self I
call  ‘governmentality’  (Foucault 2000:225). Attention paid to this dual character of rule is
what allows analytics of power to escape the narrow focus on domination. It helps us to
capture the ways in which government is more than simple ordering of actions of the gov-
erned by force and restraint and leads us to look at the ways in which government func-
tions as ordering of action of ‘free’ individuals. As Lemke argues, it is this notion of
governmentality as interplay between domination and ordering of ‘autonomous’ actions of
the governed that helps Foucault to transcend limiting dualisms of freedom and constraint
or consensus and violence (Lemke 2002). Instead, it suggests “to analyse government as
a continuum extending from political government through to forms of self-regulation”
(Lemke 2002:59). In certain respect, we may say that Foucault’s later emphasis on the
issues of governmentality and technologies of the self is a continuation of his intellectual
struggle against understanding of power as a merely repressive force. This effort is by this
move extended beyond exploration of how subject is constituted in situations of domina-
tion to consideration of how subjects relatively autonomously constitute themselves as
agents through a use of various technologies of the self. 
Importance of such perspective is perhaps made more urgent by the contemporary ratio-
nality of neo-liberal rule. Rose portrays at length how under neo-liberalism the societies
are governed increasingly through techniques which seek to utilise ‘free’ conduct of indi-
viduals. Indeed, it is opening or enlargement of spaces of freedom (and simultaneous
offering of instructions on a proper use of this freedom) that are the most distinct charac-
teristic of contemporary government (Miller and Rose 2008:209–218; Rose 1999b). Sim-
ilarly, Deleuze in his attempts to reformulate Foucault’s work on power for contemporary
conditions emphasizes that power functions increasingly through utilizing individual’s own
motivations and ambitions (Deleuze 1992, 1997; see also Gane 2012). Observation of
these developments is perhaps captured the most succinctly by Burchell: 
“Liberalism, particularly its modern versions, constructs a relationship between
government and the governed that increasingly depends upon ways in which indi-
viduals are required to assume the status of being the subjects of their lives,24
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upon the ways in which they practise their freedom” 
(Burchell 1996:29–30).
We may say that neo-liberal government, by increasingly delegating responsibility for
attaining various social goods from state to individuals simultaneously invites these indi-
viduals to utilise various doctrines and practices in order to become free, responsible and
successful subjects navigating the changing waters of contemporary society. To help them
achieve this goal plethora of advice is available from various sources (Rose 1999a:259–
265). Technologies of the self are not only made possible, but are to a great extent neces-
sitated in contemporary rationalities of government. 
However, scholarship about neo-liberal governmentality to a large extent remains focused
on the dimension of technologies of power rather than technologies of the self. The pro-
cesses of subjectification and technologies of the self are not altogether ignored and as
the brief review above shows, their importance is being recognised. Nonetheless, as Bin-
kley (2009, 2011) argues, the studies of neoliberal governmentality still remain predomi-
nantly within perspective of Foucault’s geneaological study of technologies of power or
processes of subjection. As he puts it, they focus predominantly on “the production of sub-
jects but not the production of self-producing subjects” (Binkley 2009:65). While authors
often acknowledge that doctrines of government of conduct rest on the presupposition of
citizens as entrepreneurial, independent and to a large extent self-forming subjects, we
hear surprisingly little about how precisely are subjects invited to undertake this self-form-
ing work on their selves. Often, we do not see the “ethical work by which the rationalities
of domination are extended into a program of self government itself” (Binkley 2009:65). In
other words, the governmentality scheme then remains rather top-down and deterministic,
not paying justice to Foucault’s conception of governmentality as a link between function-
ing of technologies of power and technologies of the self. Guidelines for practices of every-
day life that subjects are invited to follow are then often overshadowed by greater logics of
government (either of society as a whole, a particular institution or a field of expertise).
What seems to be lost is precisely the link between “institutional rationalities and subjec-
tivities of the individuals” (Binkley 2011:85). The question how precisely are the great
visions of neo-liberal government connected to guidelines for living in contemporary soci-
ety often remain under-explored in these accounts. In addition, Campbell (2010)makes a
case that the term rationality of government is narrowed down to a rather limited under-
standing of what rationality means. Studies of governmentality, she argues, often contain
implicit focus on cognitive and instrumental aspects of the way subjects relate to govern-
mental technologies and practices, as well as to themselves. As her study in the field of
criminal justice and apparatuses of security demonstrates, affects and emotions play an
important role in acceptance of governmental rationalities and connected practices. As
she argues, it is important to inquire into the ways in which rationalities of government
“capture hearts as well as minds” (Campbell 2010:37 emphasis in the original). 
This bias towards grand doctrines of government and general schools of (economic)
thought can perhaps be best documented by a short exploration of a status given to the
figure of homo economicus in a Foucault-inspired study of neo-liberal governmentality.
Homo economicus, according to Foucault, represents the central point of reference of
neo-liberal thought. It is a notion of an individual who rationally applies economic cost and25
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nomically rational mode of behaviour and utilise it in its plans for government. Homo eco-
nomicus is seen as not only reacting rationally to stimuli and constraints (Foucault
2008:269–270), but also as working on maximisation of its own productive potential -
understood as human capital - and financial returns stemming from it (Foucault
2008:226–228). Homo economicus is thus recognised as an ideal and central model of
subjectivity presupposed by neoliberal economic and governmental doctrines (Bröckling
2010; Dilts 2011; Foucault 2008; Read 2009). As Read argues (2009) homo economicus
represents a conception of how human beings are in their reality - a conception of human
nature. This conception of subject then translates, according to Read, into a particular
ways of living (Read 2009). It is therefore of paramount importance (Lemke 2001, 2002;
Read 2009) to explore the ways in which human beings are formed and form themselves
into this kind neo-liberal self-entrepreneurial subjects.
However, what seems to berather problematic is an ease with which passage is often
made from homo economicus as a central discursive figure of neoliberal economic theory
to homo economicus as a model for living followed by individuals themselves in their self-
shaping efforts. This is intuitively understandable, as these levels are naturally difficult to
distinguish in practice and the line drawn by Foucault between processes of subjection
and processes of subjectification seems to be rather a heuristic device than a statement
about two separate aspects of reality (see Harrer 2007). However, it seems that in certain
respect these two levels are conceptually mixed together and the processes of subjection
are taken to automatically translate into the practice of subjectification. In other words, it
seems that writers often simply assume that the version of homo economicus underpin-
ning neo-liberal economic and political theory translates unproblematically into active self-
fashioning of subjects. For example, Hamann (2009) seems to take this approach in her
article about relations of neoliberal governmentality to ethics in everyday experience.
While she acknowledges that “economic man” is a subject that must be produced within
relations of power and knowledge, she skips the ways of how such subjects are produced
altogether. Moreover, even though she acknowledges that there are particular technolo-
gies of the self offered in a form of self-help books and other guides for self-management,
she does not empirically engage with the material. Instead, she assumes that the form of
homo economicus translates directly into every day experience of individuals. Two points
are of particular importance here. Firstly, homo economicus as a living individual uses
“rational choice and cost-benefit calculation to the express exclusion of all other values
and interest” (Hamann 2009:38 emphasis in the original). It seems that this individual
does not recognize any other values, norms or affects that would lie outside the very nar-
row space of economic value. Secondly, such individual is construed as a self-interested
atom, who is unable to take into account considerations of its co-citizens and rejects an
idea of government of the social. As Hamann puts it, “[n]eoliberal subjects are constituted
as thoroughly responsible for themselves and themselves alone because they are subjec-
tified as thoroughly autonomous and free” (2009:44).  Individual living in neo-liberal times
thus seems to be a subject who sacrifices all values to economic value and whose self-
interest prevents him from thinking about collective concerns and well-being of the society
as a whole. 
From a perspective similar to that of Binkley (2009) I will argue that this perspective
indeed suffers from a “macro-level bias”. Ideal subjectivity is taken from the discourse of26
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cally assumed that this is a version of subjectivity offered to or even assumed by the
(self)governed subjects. This perspective ignores the question of whether and how the fig-
ures taken from texts of experts of economics are translated into the particular guidelines
for living - or technologies of the self - that are presented to subjects navigating everyday
waters of life in contemporary societies. What is lost, among other aspects, is the ethical
content of particular technologies of the self and their relation to a normative visions of
ideal society. As a response to this perspective, I will argue that paying attention to actual
technologies of the self offered to individuals can help us to see neo-liberalism from a dif-
ferent angle and to understand how its rationalities are actually translated into life and
experience of individuals.
 Professional self-development as a technology of the self 
Job Academy is a conference organised for students of Masaryk University by its Career
Centre, which is a university body seeking to help students to find a job during their stud-
ies or after their graduation. The event organised in 2014 consisted of several plenary
talks delivered to all the participants, as well as smaller workshops that were designed to
offer guidance in particular aspects of their preparation for the competitive job market
(such as self-presentation, CV writing, stylistic advice). The mission of Job Academy,
according to the event’s website, is to help students “to become creators of their own
career path that will originate from their individuality, and which will not only provide for
them economically, but will also be a source of fulfilment”. The conference should not
merely give advice on how to find a job, but should help students to develop a particular
attitude and set of skills that will be necessary for their personal and professional success.
The conference does not limit itself to informing students about particular realities of the
job market, but rather seeks to help students to become subjects of a particular kind - to
become creators of their careers. The goal is not simply to inform, but to help students to
change themselves. Assisting with this were various experts, ranging from successful
entrepreneurs and professionals (often Masaryk University alumni) to psychologists, fash-
ion gurus, motivational speakers and personal coaches. Two speeches delivered by two
personal coaches will be analysed here in a greater detail, as they offer particularly inter-
esting insights into the technology of the self connected to the notion of professional self-
development. Both speeches formulate certain form of ideal subjectivity in relation to
working life and devise methods of self-development that will lead to growth of such sub-
jectivity. This, according to the speakers, will lead to a development of a fulfilling work and
life, maximisation of individual happiness as well as self-actualisation. 
I will read the lectures as an example of a technology of the self. Foucault defines the tech-
nologies of the self as practices that: “permit individual to effect by their own means, or
with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls,
thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a cer-
tain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality” (Foucault 2000:225).
While various technologies differ in several dimensions, two of them will be crucial for the
analysis presented here. The first one is the dimension of “determination of ethical sub-
stance”. It represents “the way in which the individual has to constitute this or that part of27
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functions as the basis around which the technology of the self is built and forms the prime
material that is targeted through various techniques that subject applies to itself. The sec-
ond one concerns “elaboration of ethical work that one performs on oneself” (Foucault
1990:27). Subject performs ethical work on itself in order to bring its conduct into compli-
ance with a given ethical rule. Using analogy, we may say that ethical substance presents
a certain material or target of ethical pursuits, while ethical work is a particular tool or
method used to shape them.  
The road to professional success and personal happiness as it is presented in the two lec-
tures leads through laborious process. The labour starts with getting to know one’s self
properly or with mastering skill of looking at one’s self from a particular perspective.  The
process starts with identification of who listeners truly are. Only through recognising char-
acteristics of one’s individuality and one’s key talents can individual attain material pros-
perity, satisfaction with an engaging job and personal self-actualisation. Personal
uniqueness is a value that must be respected and protected. So important found one of
the speakers this message that he repeated it at the very end of the lecture, as if to
remind listeners what really matters before they will disperse: 
“I wish you that you would never forget - or that you will be constantly reminding
yourself - that you are truly unique and that you won’t allow anyone to tell you oth-
erwise.” 
(PM, 14:65). 
Protecting and nurturing of one’s authentic individuality is important goal in itself, as it
allows the individual to lead an honest and fulfilled life. However, being true to one’s true
individuality is also a characteristic that is positively valued by others, as for example by
selectors during a job interview. Two aspects - self-satisfaction and positive appraisal by
others are seen as inherently connected:
“So the genuinenessis something by which you can get people on your side. But
it’s mainly quite good for you, because you won’t have to worry about who you are;
you are just as you are.” 
(PM, 14:41)
The emphasis on the importance of authentic individuality for both success and happiness
ties this instance of discourse of professional development to what Rose called “an ethic
of authenticity” (Rose 1999a:267). This approach to ethic of the self is connected to
developments within apparatus of psychiatry and psychology whereby therapies cease to
be exclusive tools in the hands of experts and are promoted by experts who do not hold
strictly scientific status (coaches, speakers, consultants, managers) as well as by mass
media (Rose 1999a:261, 263–265). The ethic of authenticity substitutes external codes
of moral judgement with principles that are supposedly internal. In other words, norms
seen as external have to be resisted in order to make room for subjects’ own judgement
which compares the state of their being “with their inner truth” (Rose 1999a:267). In
opposition to the authentic self-formation stands life in hypocrisy and self-denial. Authen-
ticity then functions as a basis for production of one’s subjectivity which is meaningful
both to the individual herself and others. Rather than seeing it simply as a part of neo-lib-28
                                                                                                                                                                               KAREL MUSILEKeral subjectivity production machine urging individuals to become ruthless maximisers of
economic value, Rose understands the ethic of authenticity as being part of larger “‘pas-
sional economy’ in which human beings are connected into flows of needs and desires,
pleasures and anxieties” (Rose 1999a:271). However congruent this concern with authen-
ticity is with the governmental rationalities dominant in the age of the supposed crisis of
the welfare state (Rose 1999a:260), they contain irreducible ethical, affective and pas-
sional element. 
It should not surprise us to find emphasis on authenticity and personal uniqueness in lec-
tures about working life and professional self-development, as it fits rather well within
larger contours of contemporary thought about work. Theorists of work have been for
some time pointing out how the new ethics of work is tied to values of self-actualisation
and genuineness. In chapters devoted to discourses of production and management,
Rose(Mil ler and Rose 2008:173–178; Rose 1999a:103–119, 1999b:156–
158)describes how emphasis on self-fulfilment through work became dominant within this
line of thought since approximately 1980s. In a similar vein, Boltanski and Chiapello
(2006, 2007) argue that the management discourse in France since 1990s incorporated
aspects of the “spirit of 1968”, such as desire for autonomy and creativity. Reflecting on
the issues of power and resistance in contemporary workplace Fleming and Spicer
(2008:303) note that “[r]ather than exhort employees to subjectively conform to a unitary
set of values ala the 1980s cultures of commitment, the latest wave of management
gurus invites employees to simply be themselves...”. No matter how this use of ethics of
authenticity might be seen as instrumental it undeniably formulates an ethical concern
with subjectivity of the individual at work. 
In the analysed speeches we can see how similar logic is used as a part of the technology
of the self that the listeners are invited to apply to their lives. The authentic self plays the
role of ethical substance in practice of professional self-development. It is the prime mate-
rial that must be uncovered, delimited from other parts of one’s being and further devel-
oped through the use of appropriate techniques. It forms a basis of “ethical work that one
performs on oneself” (Foucault 1990:27). And work it is, as to get to truly know one’s
authentic self is not an easy task. The skill of relating to this inner authentic self must be
practised, perhaps most effectively under the guidance of a personal coach or other self-
development expert. Introspection, an honest and careful look at one’s own personality
and one’s way of life, is an important aspect of steering the life onto the path to authentic-
ity and fulfilment: 
“It is good from time to time to conduct such a small self-reflection. So you can
take a look into how you are really thinking about things, what you do, where you
are going, who you meet. Why do you do that? Does it make any sense? What do
you get from that? So, the self-reflection is important”. 
(PM, 14:47)
The second speaker, the personal coach, describes coaching as a technique which is not
based on providing any specific directive or a strict plan for life. Rather, coaching is
described as a specific form of dialogue in which coach merely helps his conversation
partner to discover what matters to her individually and what life perspective and neces-
sary actions are meaningful from this perspective: 29
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can give you a solution’. Coach won’t give you any solution. Mentor is someone
who is an expert in a particular field... mentor can help you build exactly those
skills that you need in that field. Well, life does not work that way. When I give
advice to someone, in 95% of the cases it is an absolute waste of time, because
you cannot advise people. If coach gives you an advice, it is not a coach”. 
(AV, 13:24). 
In contrast to a therapist, a consultant or a mentor, coach is not supposed to provide his
client with a strict directive or a list of steps that she needs to do in order to achieve a
desired goal. The practice of coaching is rather based on coach’s ability to assist client
through a guided dialogue to discover what goals are meaningful to her personally and
ensure that expenditure of energy in real life pursuits is in alignment with goals that are
essentially meaningful to the individual herself. Coaching is thus presented as a technique
that positions an individual as an exclusive judge of his life.  
Professional self-development, as a technology of the self presented in the two lectures,
does make the practice of active introspection central to the work on the self. Recognition
of one’s authentic self is not an easy task and its discovery requires not only certain prac-
tice and diligence, but also a particular knowledge of how the authentic self might be
obscured. The authentic self as an ethical substance must be set apart from other traits of
one’s personality, mainly from the sediments piled up on the character by the apparatuses
of family, education and collective pressures in general. These sediments represent major
obstacles to full realisation of one’s authenticity and maximal potential. One speaker
labels these sediments as “self-limiting settings” and positions them as a central problem
of self-development practice: 
“I would like to remind you that what personal development is all about is the fact
that everyone in this room, myself included, has certain self-limiting settings... a
comfort zone, things that we have given up a long time ago, dreams that we have
buried... But it does not have to be that way”.
 (PM, 14:32).
The self-limiting settings that we carry with us present a major problem to authentic self-
development. Firstly, they represent limits of possible understanding of oneself, one’s
qualities and opportunities in both personal and professional life. Secondly, they impose
harmful limits on possible behaviour. Authentic behaviour, self-actualisation and profes-
sional success stemming from it are restricted by self-limiting settings which impose stan-
dards of what action is suitable, acceptable and efficient. The central imperative of self-
development as it is presented in both lectures is, through practice of focused introspec-
tion, to make these sediments known to the subject and thus to open to a conscious
change. 
The subject of personal development, as presented in the two lectures, surely resembles
the figure of homo economicus. Most importantly, it too is an entrepreneur of the self,
working on increasing its potential (human capital) which will lead not only to self-actual-
ization but also to financial reward. However, it would be simplistic to say that personal
development reduces life to minimization of income and views personality as a portfolio of30
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sional self-development as a technology of the self formulates a certain ethical substance
- the authentic self - within individual. Moreover, it formulates a particular practical
approach to one’s self that should allow this authentic self to fully develop. In sum, rather
than reducing all values to economic value and the individual to its blind maximizer, it for-
mulates an ethical ideal of existence and a corresponding practice of its realization. It is
consideration of this technology of the self in greater detail that allows us to see the ethi-
cal dimension of incorporation of the subjective level into contemporary neo-liberal ratio-
nalities of government. 
Against normalization, towards professional utopia 
In the previous section, I have shown how discourse of professional self-development
identifies an ethical substance within the subject - the authentic self. Discovery of one’s
authentic self leads through practice of introspection that must uncover the authentic self
from factors which are obscuring it. These obstacles to authentic personal development
are seen as accumulated effects of influences from individual’s environment - family, edu-
cational institutions and societal norms in general. ‘Self-limiting settings’, as they are
called by one of the speakers, present an important point where concerns with one’s indi-
viduality are connected to the critique of larger social arrangements. 
We may say that a particular technology of the self in this way relates to the dimension of
technologies of power. In other words, the way in which one should govern oneself is set
as a basis for problematisation and critique of how one is governed by others. This issue is
strongly present in Foucault’s later works. As Karayakali argues, Foucault portrays technol-
ogies of the self as essentially transformative, as “they stem from a problematisation of
the existing forms of power relations and subjectivity in a society”  (Karakayali 2014:10).
Technologies of the self invite subject not only to conform to certain ideals and practices,
but also to question norms of behaviour and models of self-formation that are presented
to it. As Karayakali puts it aptly: 
“[A]t the heart of transformative practices is the idea of a self who confronts, at
every moment, the question of whether it will continue acting in accordance with
its past dispositions or whether it will attempt to transform itself and experiment
with new modes of existence”   
(Karakayali 2014:13). 
In the technology of professional development, certain social sentiments as well as institu-
tions concerned with education and upbringing are subject to critique. Both lectures anal-
ysed here formulate a critique of a social arrangements which are seen as hampering
development of the authentic self. An individual must carefully examine the effects these
outside pressures had on her personal development. In the following excerpt, the speaker
mentions such detrimental effects stemming from expectations set up for the individual by
her family: 31
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would be good to do some sport. [...] Well, yes. But it must make sense to you. To
you! So re-examine if you are not by chance going in a train full of things that you
do not want to do, that are a nuisance to you.”
(PM, 14:45) 
In a different excerpt, the same speaker broadens the scope of critique to encompass the
educational institutions which are seen as hampering the authentic development by
enforcing rules too strictly and by being based on essentially repressive model of educa-
tion. The target of the critique is a disciplinary pedagogy which is seen as building a “men-
tality of inadequacy” in an individual: 
“I see the entire system of elementary school, high school and university as being
based on [the premise], often, that people want to catch you when you are not
prepared and when you make a mistake. So you are writing an essay about cour-
age and you are putting your heart into it in that sixth grade. And the teacher is
standing there and she is waiting for you to screw up. [She is seeking] where you
make a grammatical mistake, where you forget to put a comma.”
 (PM, 14:4)
What has to be resisted are not only influences of institutions connected to disciplinary
education or strict demands pressed by the family on an individual. In the thought of the
speaker, the individual should be ideally shielded from any form of external judgement
and his authentic creative steps, his feelings and opinions should be applauded. What is
criticised is the development of individual in accordance with externally imposed norms in
general. Imposition of external norms is seen as building a “mentality of inadequacy”. The
individual should be critical of recommendations related to her educational and profes-
sional trajectory as well as norms of behaviour received from her social environment. Only
such step is positive which is meaningful to individual herself and which is in harmony with
her “authentic” self-understanding. 
The lecture attacks as its normative opposition disciplinary form of power. Most impor-
tantly one of its “great instruments” (Foucault 1977:184) - normalisation - that Foucault
so influentially documented in Discipline and Punish. Normalizing judgement, as Foucault
observed, is based on suppression of non-observance, of “that which does not measure
up to the rule, that departs from it” (Foucault 1977:178). Norms are not just created as
prohibitions stemming from a normative codex. They are also based on assumption of
comparability of individuals, of their results, of their performance and dynamics of their
development. Through comparison between individuals, normalising judgement does not
only confront an individual with a prototype of perfection but also with the group of his
peers, or individuals at a similar stage of education and training. In this sense, normalisa-
tion renders “... differences useful by fitting the one to another” (Foucault 1977:184). In
the discourse of professional development, as it is presented in the two lectures, such
comparison is seen as detrimental to the growth of the authentic self. Comparison of the
individual with external norms is understood as a source of the harmful “feeling of inade-
quacy” and other “self-limiting settings”. Such pressures must be resisted. Not only in
present, but subject is also instructed to reflect on harmful effects they could have on his
formation in the past. 32
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power with a critique of disciplinary effects of institutions (school, family). In this sense, it
connects the technology of the self which establishes as its ethical substance “authentic”
individual with a critique of disciplinary technology of power as it developed during moder-
nity and persisted into our present. The disciplinary form and normalisation as one of its
most important aspects is seen as a thing of the past - not only harmful to the practice of
authentic development, but also no longer functional in the present. The disciplined, nor-
malised individual, even if she is more successful than most of her peers (e.g. being uni-
versity-educated), does not have what the present employer or economic environment
demands - creativity, energy and self-determination which are all seen as results of
authentic self-development. 
The second speaker uses similar logic of critique of a certain epoch, its sentiments and
technologies utilised for formation of proper subjectivity. However, he ties this critique
more to the thought about economic and social nature of contemporary society, and to for-
mulation of a vision of ideal society of the future that is already manifested in our present.
In the following excerpt, he describes individual pursuits in entrepreneurship or employ-
ment as a joyful and creative game that listeners are invited to play. This principle (life as
a game) is contrasted with life of “serious” people, who were formed by an industrial era: 
“Anything in life can be transformed into an interesting and entertaining game....
Some people do not see it that way, they are ‘serious’. Their thinking is based on
the industrial era which lasted so long, when it was necessary for people to be the
same as others, to find stable job, to get promoted, to save some money for a
retirement and most importantly, to shut up and work hard. And this is what ‘seri-
ous’ life has to offer.”
 (AV, 13:8) 
Self development as a “game” which does not follow general normalising guidelines set by
the industrial era fits better to the present, or perhaps more precisely to the near future: 
“Nowadays, we see more start ups being established then anytime before in the
history of humanity and more people than ever before are becoming entrepre-
neurs. Well, now it is a trend in the US, but I foresee it becoming reality in the
Czech Republic too. So, the trend is that we will work independently and we will do
what we enjoy to do, what fulfils us, what helps other people and we will be paid
for doing this. But we won’t do that for money, we will do this because it will be
meaningful. And the concept of the game plays a gigantic role in this.” 
(AV, 13:10)
According to the speaker’s prognosis, the model based on pressures towards normality
and conformity as well as general guidelines for success and material wellbeing will cease
to be functional and will disappear together with the last remnants of the industrial age.
The new era of knowledge economy will make space for subjects seeking success by quite
a different means: through listening to their authentic self, recognising its special talents
and fulfilling their individual visions. Rather than financial reward, they should seek mean-
ing and fulfilment. Material prosperity will be a result of leading such life that is in accor-
dance with self-actualisation, rather than from accommodating one’s subjectivity to
general norms. Rather than following general guidelines for successful and prosperous33
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their unique potential and talents. Importantly, the level of concern with one’s individuality
is here tied to a larger socio-political narrative and reason of the government. Particular
idea of ethical substance of individuals - the authentic self - is translated into a critique of
contemporary modes of government and tied to a vision of ideal society of a near future. 
Conclusion 
A reading of the discourse of professional self-development as technology of the self
offers insights that could easily be lost in the more general accounts of workings of neo-lib-
eral governmentality. Focus on the micro-level in which subjects are called upon as agents
undertaking self-forming work allows us to see how subjects are actually addressed, what
interpretation of their lives within the contemporary constellations of government of con-
duct are offered to them and how are the realities of contemporary society construed into
an ethical problem for practice of everyday life. We can see how subjects are invited to
become entrepreneurial agents seeking not only maximisation of profit and individual
gain, but also searching for meaning and connection of their individual life with larger
political and social narratives. 
The version of subjectivity formulated within the two lectures on professional self-develop-
ment shares some fundamental traits with the figure of homo economicus. The ideal sub-
ject of professional development too is a maximiser of its human capital or the
entrepreneur of the self. It is asked to maximise its skills and to fully develop its individual
capability understood as employability or prospects of future profits. Simultaneously, in
many ways it should understand itself as an individual solely responsible for its success.
However, the subject of this version of professional development is also much more than
a pure reflection of homo economicus. It identifies as its ethical substance the authentic
self which it seeks to uncover, protect and develop. Rather than leading subject to reject
all values other than economic value, it is invited to seek authentic self-development and
self-actualisation which will bring both happiness and material well-being. The concerns
with authentic self-development also transcend the individual horizon. They are tied to a
particular critique of technologies of domination (normalisation) and to a certain under-
standing of a social and economic change. More attention being paid to technologies of
the self can also provide a space for reconsideration of social critique. Seeing from the
perspective of the technologies of the self, we can see how contemporary governmentality
incorporates values such as desire for self-actualisation and autonomy and makes them
part of the government of everyday life.
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